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Advances in Mitigating Hindsight Bias
in Patent Obviousness Analysis
Jun Wu'
INTRODUCTION
F OR an invention to merit patent protection, it must satisfy several
validity requirements codified in the Patent Act,' among which the
nonobviousness requirement3 is the most critical. The nonobviousness
requirement provides that a patent should not be granted "if the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which
said subject matter pertains. ' 4 That is, the nonobviousness requirement
mandates that a patentable invention embody a significant leap forward
in the field. If the improvement is so trivial and routine that the invention
is "obvious" to an ordinarily skilled person in the field, the subject matter
would not warrant a patent. This validity requirement represents "a careful
balance between the need to promote innovation and the recognition that
imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention
itself and the very lifeblood of a competitive economy."'  In practice,
obviousness is the most frequently litigated patent validity issue and the
most common reason to invalidate a patent.6
In determining whether a claimed invention "as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art,"7 decision-makers, including judges, jurors, and patent
examiners at the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),
must step back in time to make an objective judgment as if the invention
i J.D. expected, May 2009, University of Kentucky College of Law. The author would
like to thank Professor Harold Weinberg for reading an earlier draft of this Note and providing
many thoughtful comments.
2 35 U.S.C. §§ 10 1-3, 112 (2008).
3 35 U.S.C. § i03(a) (2oo8).
4 Id.
5 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).
6 J. R. Allison & M. A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, z6
AIPLA Q. J. 185, 208-09 (1998).
7 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2oo8).
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were unknown, even though the accomplished invention is repetitive in
front of them. Unfortunately, humans are cognitively incapable of ignoring
what they have learned of the outcome when judging past events. Due to
this deeply ingrained and highly robust hindsight bias,8 decision-makers
overestimate the likelihood of a known outcome and thereby perceive
the invention to be more obvious than it actually was at the time of
invention. 9 The bias-tainted judgment, in effect, heightens the threshold
for a true invention to merit patent protection and reduces the incentive to
innovate.
Over the past several decades, courts, particularly the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit),' ° have struggled
to establish a consistent and coherent obviousness analysis that can
effectively curb hindsight bias. The struggle culminated in the United
States Supreme Court's recent decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex
Inc." This decision, widely recognized as the Court's most important
obviousness opinion in more than forty years, sets a milestone in the courts'
long fight against hindsight bias.
In Part I, this Note briefly reviews the impact of hindsight bias on legal
decision-making in general. This part also introduces helpful insights from
psychological studies in developing strategies against the bias. Part II
summarizes the courts' efforts to confront hindsight bias in obviousness
analysis before the KSR decision. Part III discusses that decision and its
implications for future efforts to reduce hindsight bias. This Note argues
that the KSR Court's renewed flexible standard left many uncertainties to
be answered by the judicial system and at the USPTO level. This Note
concludes that KSR offers a new starting point rather than a final destination
in the long pathway to fighting hindsight bias in the patent obviousness
analysis.
I. REDUCING HINDSIGHT BIAS IN LEGAL DECISION-MAKING
People often fall victim to hindsight bias. Everyone has had the
feeling of "I-knew-it-all-along" after watching a basketball game, making
8 See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight*Foresight: The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on
Judgment under Uncertainty, I J. Exp. PsYcHoL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 297
(1975); J. J. Christensen-Szalanski & C. E Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-analysis, 48
ORGANIZATIONAL BErAV. & HuM. DECISION PROCESSES 147, 148 (i991).
9 See, e.g., Jeffrey Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REV. 571 , 614 (1998) (empirical studies on effects of hindsight bias on legal decision-
making).
io The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1295,
consolidated intermediate appellate jurisdiction over patent cases in this single court. The
Federal Circuit hears appeals from the USPTO, the U.S. District Courts, the U.S. Court of
Federal Claims, and the U.S. International Trade Commission.
11 KRS Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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a stock investment, or reading a detective novel. Once the outcome is
known, people are incapable of preventing that information from tainting
their analysis of past events and exaggerate their ability to predict the
likelihood of the actual outcome."2 Hindsight bias is prevalent in everyday
life, including legal decision-making. Many experimental studies have
also explored the methods of reduction and elimination of hindsight bias.
Hindsight bias, however, has been proven to be extremely robust, and even
the most effective method can only mitigate its effect moderately in lab
settings.
Human incapacity to ignore ex post information has been well
documented in the legal world. One example is tort actions where a
defendant's negligence must be determined after the fact. 3 Often jurors
are presented with an adverse outcome (e.g., an injured plaintiff) and are
asked to assess whether the outcome was foreseeable and whether the
defendant's conduct was reasonable. Ideally, reasonableness must be
assessed in light of the risk apparent to the defendant at the time the adverse
event occurred, and the standard is one of conduct, not of consequence. 4
Unfortunately, in the real world, the defendant's level of care is always
reviewed through the retrospectoscope. Because the tragic outcome shows
that the defendant's conduct was inadequate to avoid the plaintiff's injury,
the "you-should've-known-all-along" hindsight makes the outcome more
foreseeable, and the defendant's level of care thereby appears much less
reasonable. Even if at the time of the conduct the risk was not apparent to
the defendant, hindsight bias increases the possibility that the reasonably
acting defendant will be unfairly subjected to liability. Moreover, the size
of hindsight bias is linked to the severity of the adverse outcome, with more
severe injuries causing larger bias. 5 Decision-makers tend to attribute
blame more readily when the outcome is serious. As a result, in a medical
malpractice case, a severely injured patient may obtain a larger damage
award. 16
Hindsight bias is also present in other legal contexts. It has been shown
to taint jurors' conclusions of the legality of police searches. 7 Even when
asked to award punitive damages based solely on the legality of the search,
12 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2008).
13 See, e.g., R. Hastie, D.A. Schkade &J.W. Payne, JurorJudgments in Civil Cases: Hindsight
Effects on Judgments of Liability for Punitive Damages, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 597, 598 (1999).
14 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §435(2) (1965); see also PAGE KEETON ETAL., PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (5th ed.1984).
15 See, e.g., Brian Bornstein, From Compassion to Compensation: The Effect of Injury Severity
on Mock Jurors' Liability Judgments, 28 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1477, 1485 (1998); E. Greene,
M. Johns & J. Bowman, The Effects of Injury Severity on Jury Negligence Decisions, 23 LAW & HuM.
BEHAV. 675, 690 (1999)-
16 Greene, Johns, & Bowman, supra note 15, at 690.
17 J. D. Casper, K. Benedict & J. R. Kelly, Cognitions, Attitudes and Decision-Making in
Search and Seizure Cases, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 93, 111 (1988).
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mock jurors who were told that illegal drugs were discovered during the
search awarded significantly smaller damages than did others who were
informed that nothing was found." In business law, in order to caution
against the human tendency to perceive adverse outcomes as foreseeable
and overlook inherent market uncertaintyexpost, courts invoke the business
judgment rule to protect corporate managers from liability as a result of
negligent business decisions. 9
Ordinary lay jurors are not the only legal decision-makers susceptible
to the effects of hindsight bias. Judges and experts are vulnerable too, even
though they are trained to make careful and informed decisions in their
areas of expertise. It has been shown that judges were biased by hindsight
when evaluating auditor decisions. 0 The same is true for skilled expert
witnesses."1 In one such instance, 2 medical doctors were presented with
symptoms consistent with four different diagnoses. The doctors in each
of four hindsight groups were told that one of the four possible diagnoses
was the true diagnosis, while the foresight group was not informed of any
outcome information. When asked to assign probabilities to the likelihood
of each diagnosis, the hindsight group overestimated the likelihood of
the least likely diagnoses, even though they were explicitly instructed to
ignore outcome information and report the probabilities that they would
have given had they not known the outcome.
A rich body of empirical studies has demonstrated that hindsight bias
is stubbornly unyielding to attempts of mitigation, let alone elimination.
Scholars have proposed theories that the bias is caused by deeply ingrained
cognitive processes 3 or significant motivational forces. 4 Lab efforts in
devising strategies to accurately evaluate the foreseeability of past events in
mock courtrooms have been unsuccessful. This suggests that, even though
courts recognize the presence of the bias, a remedy may be unavailable to
18 Id. at 104.
19 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 Ezd 880, 886 (zd Cir. 1982).
20 See, e.g., J. C. Anderson, M. M. Jennings, D. J. Lowe & P. M. J. Reckers, The Mitigation of
Hindsight Bias in Judges' Evaluation of Auditor Decisions, 16 AUDITING: A J. OF PRAC. & THEORY 20,
30 (1997); M. M. Jennings, D. J. Lowe & P. M. J. Reckers, Causality as an Influence on Hindsight
Bias: An Empirical Examination of Judges' Evaluation of Professional Audit Judgment, 17 J. ACCT.
& PUB. POL'Y 143, 16i (1998).
21 See, e.g., H. R. Arkes, R. L. Wortmann, P. D. Saville & A. R. Harkness, Hindsight Bias
Among Physicians Weighing the Likelihood of Diagnoses, 66 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 252, 254 (1981); R.
J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on MedicalErrors, 347 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1933, 1936-37 (2002).
22 Arkes et al., supra note 2 1, at 253-54.
23 See, e.g., Scott A. Hawkins & Reid Hastie, Hindsight: Biased Judgments of Past Events
After the Outcomes Are Known, 107 PSYCHOL. BULL. 311, 321-22 (1990).
24 See, e.g., Elaine Walster, 'Second Guessing' Important Events, 2o HUM. REL. 239, 249
(1967).
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legal decision-making.
Among cognitive strategies that have been attempted, passive
manipulations generally have no mitigating effect at all on hindsight bias.
These passive methods include warning against the bias, 5 passive jury
instruction to avoid the bias,2 6 and practice with feedback."2 Working on
motivational factors, e.g., awarding decision-makers for correct judgments"
or forcing them to try harder, 9 reduces the size of the bias only slightly.
On the other hand, more aggressive methods that compel decision-
makers to change their mental strategies appear more promising. A number
of studies have tried to shift decision-makers' attention to alternative
outcomes.30 When decision-makers were only instructed to think of all
the possible alternative outcomes, no effect was exhibited.3 But when
they were asked to generate their own alternative outcomes and articulate
reasons in support of their alternative outcomes, hindsight bias was partially
reduced.32 Usually in those studies, prior to assigning likelihood ratings,
participants were asked to give reasons as to why each of the possible
outcomes could have occurred. The typical finding was that, although
hindsight participants (with knowledge of the actual outcome) usually still
exhibit some bias compared to the foresight group (without knowledge of
the actual outcome), the bias was significantly reduced. Promising as they
are, however, these reason-articulating methods are very intrusive to jury
deliberation and therefore may not be suitable for courtroom uses.
Finally, no strategy has been found that is capable of completely
eliminating hindsight bias.33
25 Baruch Fischhoff, Perceived Informativeness of Facts, 3 J. Exp. PsYcH: HUM. PERCEPTION
& PERFORMANCE 349,354-56 (1977).
26 K. Kamin & J. J. Rachlinski, Ex Post n Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19
LAw. & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 97-98 (1995).
27 R. E Pohl & W. Hell, No Reduction in Hindsight Bias After Complete Information and
Repeated Testing, 67 ORG. BEMAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 49, 51-55 (1996).
z8 W. Hell et al., Hindsight Bias: An Interaction of Automatic and Motivational Factors?, 16
MEMORY & COGNITION 533, 537 (1988).
29 Fischhoff, supra note 25, at 356.
30 See, e.g., H. R. Arkes et al., Eliminating the HindsightBias, 73 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 305,307
(1988); P. Slovic & B. Fischhoff, On the Psychology of Experimental Surprises, 3 J. Exp. PSYCHOL.:
HuM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 544,550-51 (1977); M. E Davies, Reduction offHindsight Bias
by Restoration of Foresight Perspective: Effectiveness of Foresight-Encoding and Hindsight-Retrieval
Strategies, 40 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 5o, 64 (1987).
31 Kamin & Rachlinski, supra note 26, at 98.
32 See Fischhoff, supra note 25, at 355-56.
33 See D. J. Lowe & M. J. Reckers, The Effects of Hindsight Bias on Jurors' Evaluations of
Auditor Decisions, 25 DECISION SCI. 401,414 (1994). The most effective de-biasing study only
reduced the bias to slightly more than one-half of the difference between ordinary hindsight
and foresight judgments.
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II. HINDSIGHT BIAS IN OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS: PRE-KSR TREATMENT
Patent obviousness analysis exemplifies a classic hindsight task: it
requires a decision-maker, either an examiner, a judge, or a jury, to perform
an ex ante judgment of whether an invention was obvious when made while
ignoring abundant ex post information. Obviousness analysis requires a
decision-maker to make the judgment whether a claimed invention was
obvious at the time it was made; however, when a patent application or a
patent comes to an examiner or a court, an invention has been achieved and
a problem has been solved. In today's commercial world, an invention may
have been widely enjoyed even when its patent application is still pending.
Furthermore, it is a statutory mandate that an inventor must disclose in the
patent application the method by which the invention was made and the
prior art on which it relied. 34 This information is fully available to decision-
makers. In fact, this information is also available to an alleged patent
infringer asserting an obviousness defense who may use it as a roadmap for
reconstructing the invention as obvious.
One should not forget that an invention's obviousness is judged against a
person having the ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA),35 which exacerbates
the problem. In determining the skill level of the PHOSITA, a decision-
maker must again rewind time. Because the skill level has been increased
at the time of the judgment, a decision-maker may perceive the PHOSITA
knew more than he actually did.36 Judged against this elevated level of
ordinary skill, an invention is more likely obvious. As the combined effect,
hindsight bias exerts a greater impact on obviousness analysis.
The influence of hindsight bias is large enough to be of concern to
the legal system. An empirical study has reported that hindsight bias
significantly influenced mock jurors' obviousness judgments.37 In addition,
the magnitude of jurors' hindsight bias in the obviousness judgment
was greater than that reported for other legal judgments.38 The tainted
obviousness analysis results in a systematic error, distorting the patent
validity standard, heightening the threshold for a true invention to merit
patent protection, and lowering the incentive to innovate. To this end, it
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that patents promote progress. 39
Courts have recognized that they "must be continually on guard against
34 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2008).
35 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2008).
36 See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight
Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L. J. 1391, 1405 (2oo6).
37 Id. at 1394.
38 Id.
39 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("Congress shall have Power... To promote the Progress
of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... "). See Graham v. John Deere
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the natural tendency to treat as obvious something which appears simple
in the light of hindsight, but which may not actually have been so at the
time of the invention." 4 In Graham v. John Deere Co., 41 the seminal case
on obviousness analysis, the Supreme Court held that obviousness is a
question of law that depends upon critical factual inquiries. The Court
provided a procedural framework for the factual determinations under 35
U.S.C. § 103: first, the scope and content of the prior art-the state of the
knowledge in the relevant technological fields at the time the invention
was made-must be ascertained; second, the differences between the
claimed invention and the prior art are assessed; and, finally, the level of
ordinary skill of a PHOSITA in the pertinent art is determined. 41
However, these three prongs (dubbed the "Graham test") merely
translate the statutory language into a sketchy list of necessary steps in often
highly technical inquiries, and overlook the fact that judges and jurors may
not have adequate knowledge to understand technical or scientific subject
matters of the invention at issue. Furthermore, the Graham test does not
offer clear guidance on how to make a factual finding whether a PHOSITA
would have seen the claimed invention as obvious without being affected
by hindsight bias. It is not surprising that experimental studies have found
that mock jurors who are given an instruction that simply stated the Graham
procedure performed no better than hindsight judgments. 43
Partially in response to the influence of hindsight bias, the Court
permitted use of "secondary considerations"-a list of economic
evidence-in addition to the Graham inquiry.4 The Court encouraged
making reference to these secondary factors because they "give light to the
circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be
patented" 4 and "guard against slipping into the use of hindsight."46 Those
secondary considerations include, but are not limited to the following:
"commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and the] failure
of others. ' 47  Clearly these factors no longer focus on the technological
merits of an invention, which to some extent eases the courts' struggle with
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966).
40 Teleflex Inc. v. American Chain & Cable Co., 273 E Supp. 573, 587 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
Seealso Erie Technological Products, Inc. v. Die Craft Metal Products, Inc., 318 F Supp. 933,
936 (N.D. II1. 1970) (In determining whether a patent is invalid for obviousness, a court must
guard against "slipping into hindsight.") (citing Graham v. John Deere 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
41 Graham, 383 U.S. at I (1966).
42 Id. at I8.
43 Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue
Before the Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALE J. L. &TECH. 1, 17 (2007).
44 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17-18.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 36 (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckthorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 E2d
406,412 (6th Cir. 1964)).
47 Id. at 17.
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complicated technical inquiries, which they are incompetent to undertake.
To courtroom decision-makers, the evidence of the invention's commercial
success, its resolution of a long-felt unresolved need, or its success in the
area where others had failed, seems more comprehensible, more objective,
and thus less susceptible to hindsight bias.
Although the Graham Court did not state when and how secondary
considerations can prove nonobviousness, secondary considerations have
grown in importance since their inception. The Federal Circuit has
expanded the list of secondary considerations to include another person's
copying48 or licensing49 of the patented invention, unexpected results of
invention,50 and skepticism of those in the art before the invention was
made."t The Federal Circuit has elevated the significance of the secondary
factors and has held that courts should consider this evidence as a mandatory
part of the "totality of the evidence" used to reach a conclusion regarding
obviousness."2
On the other hand, many critics noticed that secondary considerations
are much less reliable indicators of an invention's merits than they appear.
For example, commercial success may have nothing to do with significant
technical advance, for it may result from a number of confounding factors,
including marketing, advertising, market access, etc.53 The nexus between
the claimed technical superiority and the commercial success becomes
more complex when the claimed invention is only part of a product. The
other items on the list, such as long-felt need, 4 and copying or licensing by
others,55 have come under similar attacks. Although some have suggested
that introducing secondary considerations into patent obviousness judgment
resembles courts' general reliance on established medical guidelines in
resolving medical malpractice litigation 56 -both being the products of
courts' distrust of triers' competence in judging highly specialized subject
matter-secondary considerations lack the required clarity and definiteness
that are the core of the ex ante norms of medical guidelines.
Critics of secondary considerations find support in a survey 52 conducted
on all reported federal courts' obviousness cases during an eighteen-month
48 See, e.g., Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F2d 981, 991 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
49 See, e.g., In re Sernaker, 702 F2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
50 See, e.g., United States v. Adams 383 U.S. 39, 51 (1966).
51 See, e.g., id. at 52.
52 See e.g., Vandenberg v. Dairy Equipment Co., 740 Ezd 156o, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
Richardson-Vicks Inc. v. Upjohn Co., 122 E3d 1476, 1483 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
53 Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 859 (1988).
54 Id. at 872.
55 Id. at 872-73.
56 Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 615.
57 Mandel, supra note 36, 1422-23.
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period from 2004 to 2005. This survey reported a number of interesting
statistics: the secondary consideration evidence was relevant to the holding
that the invention was not obvious only in less than one third of decisions; 8
and, under further scrutiny, the evidence was dispositive in no more than
2 percent of reported cases.59 The impact of secondary considerations
"appears to be a drop in the bucket compared with the strong effect of the
hindsight bias."'
To fill in the blanks left by the amorphous Graham test, the Federal
Circuit has tried to fashion rules that can provide greater certainty and reduce
hindsight bias. The rules are collectively called the "teaching, suggestion,
or motivation" (TSM) test. The Federal Circuit believes that the best
defense against the "'subtle but powerful"' influence of hindsight bias in
obviousness judgment is the "'rigorous application of the requirement for
a showing of the teaching or motivation to combine prior art references."'61
Because the core innovation in most inventions is a combination of what
has already been known in new and unforeseen ways, 6 patentability is not
foreclosed simply because an invention can be reconstructed from prior
arts. In fact, one true measure of the significance of an innovation is the
uniqueness and ingeniousness of the combination. The Federal Circuit
had embraced this approach and insisted that the standard was that, in
order to find an invention obvious, a PHOSITA must "not only have had
some motivation to combine the prior art teachings, but some motivation
to combine the prior art teachings in the particular manner claimed [in the
invention]. ' 63 Although the basic requirement of proving existence of
teaching, suggestion, or motivation of making the combination still falls
within the Graham test, the Federal Circuit has rigorously applied the
additional requirement: the motivation to make the particular combination
in the disputed invention must be expressly present in prior arts. Absent
such an express record, the invention would be deemed to be not obvious.
As the Federal Circuit has repeatedly stressed in its obviousness decisions,
the inventor's own disclosure cannot be used by challenging parties as a
"blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat patentability-the
essence of hindsight."64
According to the Federal Circuit, the goals of the TSM test are twofold:
58 Id.
59 Id.
6o Id. at 1423.
61 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., i i9 E App'x 28z, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting In re
Dembiczak, 175 F3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
62 In re Rouffet, 149 E3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cit. 1998) ("'virtually all [inventions] are
combinations of old elements."') (quoting Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713
E2d 693, 698 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
63 Teleflex, i 19 F App'x at z86 (emphasis added).
64 In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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(1) eliminating the use of hindsight in obviousness determinations, and (2)
improving the uniformity and predictability of the obviousness analysis.6" If
applied properly, the Federal Circuit's approach would bring predictability
and certainty to the difficult task of quantifying obviousness standard and
provide a bulwark against hindsight bias. However, requiring an explicit
showing of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art is not
the only way to assess the substantiality of an innovation. For this reason,
high-tech industries have sharply criticized the requirement of an expressed
motivation found in prior art as lowering the bar for the nonobviousness
requirement.' Even though a combination might be obvious by common
sense, the evidence required by the Federal Circuit often is unavailable,
simply because the motivation to combine is too obvious to be worth
recording.67 Because the TSM test relentlessly requires a specific finding
that points unequivocally to the patent at issue, it had been criticized as
rigid, prophylactic, and conservative.
It seems that neither the overly flexible Graham framework nor the
uncompromising TSM test can adequately mitigate hindsight bias. On
one end of the spectrum, the Graham test would invalidate many true
innovations as obvious under unchecked influence of hindsight bias; on
the other end, the Federal Circuit's overly rigid application of TSM test
would make some unworthy patents difficult to invalidate.68
III. OBVIOUSNESS ANALYSIS AFTER KSR
A. KSR Decision
The Engelgau patent at issue in KSR claimed a means for electronically
controlling the throttle of a vehicle's engine by combining (1) an electronic
sensor with (2) an adjustable gas pedal with a fixed pivot point. Each of these
two elements was individually known in the prior art references; therefore
the Engelgau patent was a classic example of adaptation of old techniques
(the traditional adjustable pedal) to new techniques (the addition of an
electronic sensor). The district court granted summary judgment for the
defendant KSR, holding that the Engelgau patent was invalid, because it
would have been obvious to a PHOSITA to combine these fully disclosed
prior art elements, and the technological advance of the industry would
have suggested the combination, given the nature of the problem and the
demands of the market.69
65 In re Kahn, 441 E3d 977, 986 (Fed. Cit. 2oo6).
66 See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
550 U.S. 398 (Aug. 2z, zoo6) (No. 04-1350), 2oo6 WL 24536oi.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Teleflex Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 298 E Supp. 2d 581, 596 (E.D. Mich. 2003), rev'd, i 19 E
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The Federal Circuit reversed on the basis that the district court had
misapplied the TSM test.7" The proper application of the test, according
to the Federal Circuit, would have required the district court to make
factual findings showing that the "'specific understanding or principle
within the knowledge of the skilled artisan that would have motivated
one with no knowledge of [the] invention to make the combination in the
[particular] manner claimed"' by the Engelgau patent. 1 Because the prior
arts addressed different problems than those did by the Engelgau patent,
the Federal Circuit concluded that those prior arts could not supply the
teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine them in the manner claimed
in the Engelgau patent.7" Amicus curiae briefs before the Supreme Court
on KSR divided on whether the Graham test should be restored or whether
the TSM test should be retained in its entity.73
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Federal Circuit's
decision.74 The KSR opinion represents neither doctrinal overhaul nor
repudiation. The Court seems to be rewinding time itself-back 40 years
to the Graham test."5 Although there still must be a finding of "reasons" to
combine the prior art for the purpose of proving obviousness, the reason
does not have to be as required by the TSM test. Any legitimate reason
to combine, including common sense and common knowledge, market
demands, or the motivation to try with reasonable expectations of success,
may justify an obviousness finding. However, beyond disavowing the rigid
rules that Federal Circuit had applied for years, the KSR Court's substantive
holding was limited.
The Court found several errors in the Federal Circuit's overly restrictive
obviousness analysis. Specifically, the Federal Circuit had erred in (1)
"holding that courts and patent examiners should look only to the problem
the patentee was trying to solve;"' 6 (2) assuming "that a person of ordinary
skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements of
prior art designed to solve the same problem;"" and (3) by concluding
App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev'd, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
70 Teleflx, i19 F App'x at 290 (Fed. Cir. 2005), revd, 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
71 Id. at 288 (quoting In re Kotzab, 217 F3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
72 Teleflex, I i9 F App'x at 290 (rev'd550 U.S. at 398).
73 See, e.g., Brief for the United States asAmicus Curiae, KSR Int'l Co. v.Teleflex, Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (Aug. 22, 2006) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 24536oi; Brief of Twenty-Four Intellectual
Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR, 550 U.S. at 398
(Aug. 22, 2006) (No. 04-1350), 2oo6 WL 2452369; Brief of Cisco Systems Inc. et al., as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, KSR, 550 U.S. at 398 (Aug. 22, 2006) (No. 04-1350), 2oo6 WL
2452365; Brief of Practicing Patent Attorneys as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, at
4-5, KSR, 550 U.S. at 398 (Oct. 16, 2006) (No. 04-1350), 2oo6 WL 2967756.
74 KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 127 S.Ct. 1727 (2007).
75 Id. at 1742.
76 Id.
77 Id.
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"that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that
the combination of elements was 'obvious to try.' ''7 As the result, this
formalistic application of the TSM test denied factfinders "recourse to
common sense." 79 The "common sense" of a person skilled in the art is
now sufficient to support a finding of a necessary motivation element, and
the claimed invention must show that it "is more than the predictable use
of prior art elements according to their established functions."8 In place
of the TSM test, the Court emphasized that "[tihe combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results."81
One primary purpose of the rigorous TSM test has been to ward off
impermissible hindsight bias. After this approach was disfavored by the
Court, to the disappointment of many awaiting a solution, the Court did
not craft a clear rule that seriously contemplated mitigating hindsight bias.
It seems that the Court felt more frustrated by the Federal Circuit's rigid
approach, after weighing the danger of hindsight bias that the Federal
Circuit has repeatedly warned against and the risk of over-issuing patents as
the consequence of the TMS analysis. Without offering much explanation,
the Court pointed out that the Federal Circuit "drew the wrong conclusion
from the risk of courts and patent examiners falling prey to hindsight
bias,""2 noting that "[rligid preventative rules that deny factfinders recourse
to common sense, however, are neither necessary under our case law nor
consistent with it."8
3
However, this does not mean that the Court allows "common sense,"
whether guided by hindsight or not, to play an equal role in obviousness
analysis. Otherwise, it would be saying that if it seems obvious in hindsight,
it is, and decades of judicial efforts in fighting hindsight bias would
evaporate under KSR. The Court timely warned that "[a] factfinder should
be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be
cautious of arguments reliant upon expost reasoning." 4 Unfortunately the
Court did not advance an operable guideline to confront hindsight bias.
When the Court opted for obviousness analysis under the Graham
framework, secondary considerations survived.85 In the wake of KSR,
which dismissed rigid applications of the TSM test as excessive prevention
against hindsight bias, inventors would be expected to rely more on
secondary considerations for this purpose, particularly given the Federal
78 Id.
79 Id.
8o Id. at 1740.
81 Id. at 1739.
8z Id. at 1742.
83 Id. at 1742-43.
84 Id. at 1742.
85 Id. at 1739.
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Circuit's elevation of their significance to the most probative evidence
available on obviousness.8 6 In the future, these economic or motivational
indicators of nonobviousness should be presented with more rigor to fight
hindsight bias. For example, commercial success of the invention and the
existence of licenses or copying by others are only entitled to "substantial
significance in an obviousness decision" if they include a nexus to the
claimed invention. 87 Patent owners must take care to introduce evidence
that ties sales and licenses to the superiority of the invention and not to
other confounding factors, such as marketing, advertising, and access to
the market. However, although secondary considerations represent an
inventor's best hope of demonstrating nonobviousness, their effectiveness
against hindsight bias remains in question.88
The key message of the KSR court is that, when a decision-maker
examines the teachings of prior art for sources of information that show how
and why a claimed invention would have been obvious to a PHOSITA, he
should remain flexible in his approach. The sources of information should
include the common sense and knowledge of the PHOSITA, the relevant
teachings of multiple prior art references, and the motivation to try under
the demand of the marketplace.89 However, this renewed analysis has the
same problem as the overly flexible Graham test: hindsight bias remains
unchecked.
We have to look into the procedural effects of KSR in order to find its
impact on mitigating hindsight bias. A positive aspect of the KSR decision,
from the standpoint of mitigating hindsight bias, is the Court's demand
that a patent rejection on the ground of obviousness must have an explicit
analysis demonstrating the obviousness of the invention. According to the
Court, "[t]o facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit."' The
Court cited, with approval, a recent Federal Circuit's opinion: "[Riejections
on obviousness grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements;
instead, there must be some articulated reasoning with some rational
underpinning to support the legal conclusion of obviousness." 9' Under this
explicit evidentiary requirement, decision-makers would reasonably be
expected to engage actively in weighing alternative outcomes, determining
the proper skill level of a PHOSITA, and articulating reasons to support
the obviousness finding. This type of mental strategy has been shown to
86 See, e.g., Vandenberg v Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F2d 156o, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1984); 3M Co.
v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 E2d 1559, 1573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
87 Cable Elec. Prods. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 E2d 1015, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1985), ovemledon
other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 E3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
88 See Mandel, supra note 36, 56-59.
89 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741.
90 Id.
91 Id. (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F3 d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
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moderately reduce hindsight bias.9 Its implication will be further explored
in the next section where the USPTO's implementation of this procedural
requirement is discussed.
In KSR, the Court reaffirmed that the validity of a patent is a question of
law.93 Since the issue of "obviousness is a legal determination," the Court
held it appropriate to reach its conclusion at the stage of the summary
judgment.' While such an action promotes a relatively inexpensive
and quick judicial finding regarding obviousness, and is expected to be
welcomed by the parties who have long sought such an efficient method
for challenging questionable patents, it nevertheless encourages judges to
engage themselves more in ex post judgments. However, it has been shown
that judges are as susceptible to hindsight bias as ordinary jurors. 9
B. USPTO's Role in Future Obviousness Analysis
The KSR decision has impacted the patent examination process. In
response to the Court's decision, the USPTO has revised its patent
examination guidelines in order for examiners to make proper obviousness
determinations. 96 The examination guidelines, like the KSR decision itself,
emphasize the continued importance of the approach originally delineated
in Graham. In the guidelines' publishing announcement, the Commissioner
for Patents stressed that the factual inquiries in Graham "'remain the basis
for every decision regarding obviousness"' and patent examiners would
continue to consider the three prongs prescribed by the Graham Court.97
The new guidelines incorporate the test formed in KSR's decision that
combinations of known elements must be "'more than the predictable
use of prior art elements according to their established functions."'9 In
resolving the level of ordinary skill of a PHOSITA, the guidelines again
quote KSR: "'A person of ordinary skill in the art is also a person of ordinary
creativity, not an automaton," ' 99 and "'in many cases a person of ordinary
skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like
92 See Arkes, supra note 3o , at 306-07; Karmin & Rachlinski, supra note 26, at 97-99;
Fischhoff, supra note 25, at 354-56.
93 KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1745.
94 Id. at 1745-46 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 US 1, 17 (1966)).
95 See Anderson et al., supra note 20.
96 Examination Guidelines for Determination Obviousness Under 35 U.S.C 103 in View
of the Supreme Court Decision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc, 72 Fed. Reg. 57526
(Oct. 10. 2007). [Hereinafter: Guidelines].
97 Press Release, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (Oct. 10, 2007), available at http:I
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/o7-43.htm.
98 Guidelines, 72 Fed. Reg. at 57527 (citing KSR, i27 S.Ct. at 1740).
99 Id. at 57528 (citing KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 1742).
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pieces of a puzzle."' ' 0 The examiners may also take into account "'the
inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would
employ."'101 The source of a PHOSITA's knowledge and ability can be
either "documentary prior art, general knowledge in the art, or common
sense."10 In addition to these factors, patent examiners "may rely on their
own technical expertise to describe the knowledge and skills of a person
of ordinary skill in the art."'0 3 After all, examiners are generally trained
in the technical field in which they review patent applications. Perhaps
they are themselves PHOSITAs, or at least experts who can be expected
to know what the level of skill in the art was at the time of the invention.
The increasing role of the PHOSITA also boosts the importance of patent
examiners.
When a PHOSITA is imbued with ordinary creativity and needs not
rely on express suggestions or motivations to combine existing references,
the flexibility comes at the cost of transparency and certainty. Therefore
the risk of hindsight bias looms over the examiner's determination of
the PHOSITA and the ultimate obviousness finding. Fortunately, the
examination guidelines set forth tightened procedural requirements to
alleviate the hindsight influence on examiners. The guidelines require
that when an examiner is making a factual finding, he must:
[E]nsure that the written record includes findings of fact concerning the
state of the art and the teachings of the references applied. In certain
circumstances, it may also be important to include explicit findings as to
how a person of ordinary skill would have understood prior art teachings, or
what a person of ordinary skill would have known or could have done."°
Furthermore, the examiner's unsupported reliance on common sense or
common knowledge, without more, is insufficient to warrant an obviousness
rejection. To help patent examiners make obviousness rejections that are
supported by appropriate factual findings and reasoning, the guidelines
identify a number of rationales suggested by the KSR decision. 105 For
each rationale, the guidelines explain the underlying factual findings, and
how to reason from the facts to the legal conclusion of obviousness. The
guidelines explain the procedural requirements:
The key to supporting any rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 is the clear
articulation of the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been
obvious. The Supreme Court in KSR noted that the analysis supporting
ioo Id.
ioi Id. (citing KSR, 127 S.Ct. at 174I).
102 Id. at 57527.
103 Id. at 57528.
104 Id. at 57527.
105 Id. at 57528-34.
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a rejection under 35 U.S.C. 103 should be made explicit. The Court
quoting In re Kahn stated that "'[R]ejections on obviousness cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
legal conclusion of obviousness.' 106
If this set of reason-articulating requirements is combined with the
alternative outcomes analysis, studies have suggested it would be a very
promising way to mitigate hindsight bias. 07
Doubting courts' ability to strike an appropriate balance between
effectively combating hindsight bias and solvingoverissuance of substandard
patents, some scholars have suggested that a better reform opportunity
would lie at the USPTO level."0 8 One reason for this suggestion is that
USPTO's expertise can reduce the degree of hindsight bias involved in
decision-making. However, the mere assumption that experts, or judges
for that matter, are less susceptible to hindsight bias has been shown to be
unfounded. °9 But a patent examiner's familiarity with the area of a patent
application at hand makes him a more competent PHOSITA than a court
that steps in later and hypothesizes the skill level of such a mythical figure.
This is particularly important when the court's approach is moving away
from a narrow view of finding specific motivation in the prior arts to the
common sense and common knowledge possessed by a PHOSITA.
A stronger argument is that Congress has the authority and resources
to devise a better solution than the courts could, because the balance
between concerns of reducing hindsight cost and preventing the grant of
substandard patents is ultimately a policy issue.110 The USPTO, through
delegated authority from the Congress and its expertise, can adopt creative
solutions to address both concerns simultaneously. The USPTO may start
with improving its administrative procedures in granting a patent, as it has
done following the KSR decision. By requiring patent examiners to abide
by examining procedures that are more immune to hindsight bias, it would
reduce costly litigation down the road and, if a dispute came to the court,
the examiner's decision would warrant more deference.
Scholars advocating reforms at the USPTO have also suggested
io6 Id. at 57528-29.
107 See Walster, supra note 24, at 249; Fischoff, supra note 25, at 354-56; Kamin &
Rachlinski, supra note 26, at 97-98; Pohl & Mell, supra note 27, at 55; Hell, et al., supra note 28,
at 535-36; Arkes et al., supra note 3o, at 306-07.
1o8 See, e.g., Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEo. L.J. 269 (2007).
io9 See Arkes et al., supra note 21, at 253-54.
i io See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 8 ("The Congress shall have power... To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries....").
[VOL. 97
HINDSIGHT BIAS
introducing an adversarial process into the patent examination procedure."'
In the current system, the adversarial process usually starts in court,
where the decision-makers are burdened with examining new prior art
references presented by parties who challenge the validity of the patent
at issue. Judges and jurors, who often lack competence, are forced to take
up patent examiners' responsibilities in reviewing the new evidence and
making patent validity judgments. Allowing adverse parties, who have a
strong incentive to present prior art evidence up front, to do so would help
the USPTO examiners make better-informed judgments and thereby
reduce future litigation. This would alleviate courts from the unfit task of
examining highly technical evidence in the event that a dispute ends up
in the courtroom.
Conclusion
The question of whether an invention is obvious is at the core of the
delicate balance struck by the patent system: its limited protection must
be granted only to significant advances. Drawing clear lines along the
obviousness threshold is an illusory affair, which is further complicated by
the existence of intricate hindsight bias in decision-making.
It seems so far that KSR does not represent the sea change that many
were hoping to see. Although the Court rejected the rigid approach of
the Federal Circuit, it did not reject the spirit of the TSM test. In the
Court's own words, "[tihere is no necessary inconsistency between the idea
underlying the TSM test and the Graham analysis.""'  By applying the
TSM test, the Federal Circuit served a very important goal and "captured
a helpful insight."" 3 To fill in the blanks of the ambiguous Graham test,
the Federal Circuit made a worthy effort to fashion a set of consistent,
predictable, and articulable rules in order to support its obviousness analysis
and mitigate hindsight bias. However, after making a premature policy
judgment, the Court renewed the overly flexible Graham analysis, without
providing new guidelines for confronting hindsight bias in the future or
constructively commenting on the Federal Circuit's efforts. This approach
leaves inquiries under § 103 unpredictable, unsettled, and subject to the
hindsight of courts.
Fortunately, though the KSR decision favored an indecisively broad
obviousness inquiry, procedurally it still required that "'there must be
some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the
III See e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives To Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might
Help, 19 BERKELEY TEcH. L.J. 943, 960-68 (2004).
112 KSR Int'l Co v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741 (2007).
113 Id.
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legal conclusion of obviousness." 1 14 Determining if there is an articulated
reason requires analyses of various factors and many alternative outcomes.
These analyses will fill in the large gaps of the Graham test and also guard
against hindsight bias.
In addition, because the Court's solution is unlikely to reduce hindsight
bias problems in a systematic way, reforms should be encouraged to take
place at the level of the USPTO, where examiners are likely to be slightly
less influenced by, and better equipped to deal with, hindsight bias. Further
strengthened procedural guidelines will facilitate this purpose.
114 Id. (citing In re Kahn, 441 F3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2oo6)).
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